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ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS IN MAKING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Thomas L. Vankirk*
I. Introduction
The antitrust laws of the United States have taken on
an increasingly significant role with regard to acquisi-
tions and investments generaly, and must be taken into con-
sideration by a foreign investor interested in making foreign
investments in the United States. Where the requisite con-
tracts exist to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the
antitrust laws of the United States will be applied to all
proscribed acts regardless of the nationality of the partici-
1 It is clear that most foreign investment in thepants. iclathtmsfoeginetetnte
United States constitutes the requisite minimum contacts re-
quired for jurisdiction. 2
There are two primary antitrust areas which should be
addressed by those counseling foreign investors interested
in investing in the United States. First, attention should
be given to antitrust matters relating to the initial ac-
quisition of assets in the United States. Second, foreign
investors should receive counsel regarding general prohibi-
tions contained in the United States antitrust laws, par-
ticularly where United States law applied more stringent or
* Mr. Vankirk is a partner in Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rode-
wald, Kyle & Buerger, 600 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA
15219. The author acknowledges, with appreciation, the
assistance of Robert W. Brown, Esq., who is associated with
Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle and Buerger in the
preparation of these materials.
1. See, e.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-
Mousson,736 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co.
Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
different requirements than typical antitrust laws in for-
eign countries.
Two statutes are of primary concern in this analysis.
3
The Sherman Act, prohibits any contract, combination or con-
spiracy that creates an unreasonable "restraint on trade,"
4
5
and restricts monopolies or attempts to monopolize. These
provisions apply to all "trade or commerce among the several
states or with foreign nations." 6 The Clayton Act, 7 pro-
scribes price discrimination, ties-ins and exclusive dealings,
and, of most significance for this analysis, bars the acquisi-
tion of stock or assets where the effect is to substantially
8
lessen competition in a line of commerce.
II. Acquisition of American Interests by a Foreign Entity
A. Premerger Notification
Section 7A of the Clayton Act 9 requires parties l O to
acquisitions (meeting certain size requirements), to make a
premerger notification filing and observe certain statutory
waiting periods before consummating a transaction. Any
transaction to which section 7A applies is subject to the
filing of prior notification with the United States Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
the statutory waiting period may be extended should either
agency request additional information regarding the proposed
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
8. See, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976) [added to the Clayton Act
by Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, title II, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390
(1976)].
10. Parties must meet certain size requirements. See
15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
11
acquisition. This section applies to the acquisition of
12
either voting shares or assets. The purpose of section
7A is to enhance the federal government's capability for
preventive enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act
1 3
by giving its antitrust enforcement agencies the opportunity
for advance screening of substantial acquisitions.
Section 7A applies if the acquiring or acquired per-
son is engaged in commerce or any activity affecting com-
merce. 14 It should be noted that this commerce require-
ment is stated in the disjunctive and hence is even less
demanding than section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is
phrased in the conjunctive.
The rules promulgated by the FTC under section 7A
1 5
define "commerce ''1 6 as interstate or foreign commerce as
defined in section 1 of the Clayton Act 1 7 and section 4 of
the FTC Act.
1 8
Accordingly, section 7A may, by its terms, be appli-
cable to an acquisition by a foreign person 1 9 having no
pre-existing sales into, or presence in, the United States.
In fact, the FTC, in its statement of basis and purposes ac-
companying the promulgation of its notification rules, has
taken the position that a domestic acquisition that meets
the size tests, and qualifies for none of the other exemp-
tions, will be subject to section 7A when made by a foreign
person to the same extent as when made by a domestic
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(1) (1976).
15. 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-803 (1982).
16. 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(1) (1972).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
19. Defined to include national persons as well as all
forms of partners of legal persons but to exclude the for-
mation of unincorporated joint ventures. 15 U.S.C. § 18A
(1976).
20
acquirer.
Section 7A does not alter the subjective impact of the
antitrust laws, but its file and wait provisions purport to
apply to reportable acquisitions without regard to the
Sherman or Clayton Acts. 2 1 If jurisdiction can be estab-
lished, a potential foreign acquirer in violation of sec-
tion 7A may be subjected to noncompliance civil penalties
(up to $10,000 per day) and/or to an injunction pending
compliance, whether or not the substantive requirements of
section 7 of the Clayton Act were met.
2 2
The FTC's rules do contain certain exemptions specifi-
cally applicable to acquisitions by "foreign persons"
'2 3
(defined as a person the ultimate parent entity of which is
neither incorporated in nor organized under the laws of,
nor has its principal offices in, the United States or, if
a natural person, is neither a citizen nor resident of the
United States). 2 4 These exemptions are based on the con-
clusion that the acquisitions will have only minimal impact
on United States commerce and, hence, the principle of
comity dictates abstension. The exempted acquisitions are:
1. an acquisition of assets located outside the
United States; 2 5
2. an acquisition of United States-located assets
of less than $10 million (not including in-
vestment assets -- defined as cash, deposits
in financial institutions, other money market
instruments and instruments evidencing
government obligations); 2 6
3. an acquisition of voting securities of a foreign
issuer which will confer control of neither (a)
an issuer which holds United States-located
20. See, 43 Fed. Reg. at 33498-99 (July 31, 1978).
.21. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 18(g) (1976).
23. 16 C.F.R. § 802.51 (1982).
24. 16 C.F.R. § 8 01.i(e)(2)(i) (1982).
25. 16 C.F.R. § 8 02.51(a) (1982).
26. 16 C.F.R. § 8 02.51(c) (1982).
assets having an aggregate book value of $10
million or more (not including investment
assets) nor (b) a United States issuer with
annual net sales or total assets of $10
million (not including investment assets);
2 7
4. an acquisition where (a) the acquired person
is also foreign and (b) neither the combined
aggregate annual sales of both the acquiring
and acquired persons in or into the United
States nor (c) such persons' aggregate United
States-located assets, not including invest-
ment assets, amount of $110 million.2 8
In any other case, the fact that the acquiring person
is foreign has no particular significance in determining
the applicability of section 7A, although that fact may af-
fect the amount of date required to be furnished. If the
acquisition meets the commerce test and qualifies for no
other exemption in section 7A or the FTC rules, the file-
and-wait requirements will apply if both of the following
size tests are met:
2 9
1. SIZE-OF-PERSON TEST.
The acquisition will not be reportable unless
it involves (a) an acquired person either (1)
engaged in manufacturing and having annual
net sales or total assets of at least $10
million or (2) not engaged in manufacturing
and having total assets of at least $10 mil-
lion and an acquiring person with total assets
or annual net sales of at least $100 million,
or (b) an acquired person with total assets
or annual net sales of at least $100 million
and acquired person with total assets or annual
net sales of at least $10 million; 3 0
2. SIZE-OF-ACQUISITION TEST.
The acquisition will not be reportable unless
it would result in the acquiring person's
holding at least 15% of the voting securities
or assets of the acquired person or an aggre-
gate total amount of voting securities and/or
assets of the acquired person in excess of
$15 million. In addition, subsequent acquisi-
tions will be reportable if they (a) would
result in the acquiring person's crossing
one of certain higher notification thresholds
and (b) do not qualify for an exemption which
27. 16 C.F.R. § 802.5(b)(1)(2) (1982).
28. 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(d) (1982).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(2) (1976).
relates to the crossing of a higher threshold
within five years of making a duly reported ac-
quisition at a lower threshold. However, under
a key exemption, a transaction which would re-
sult in the crossing of the $15 million threshold but
not the 15% threshold is exempt if it would not
result in the acquiring person's holding neither
(a) assets of the acquired person valued at more
than $10 million nor (b) voting securities that
confer control of an issuer which, together with
all entities it controls, has annual net sales or
total assets of $10 million or more. 3 1
The FTC has taken the position that it is not empowered by
section 7A to grant ad hoc exemptions to the file-and-wait
provisions if an acquisition does not qualify for any of
the general classes of exemption set forth in the statute
32
and the rules. The agencies will, however, issue inter-
pretations of section 7A and will entertain applications
for early termination of the waiting period once the re-
quired notification has been filed.
3 3
The initial waiting period imposed by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act varies with the nature of the acquisition.
These periods are as follows:
1. Cash tender offer -- fifteen days following
the acquiring person's filing; 3 4
2. Acquisitions not requiring negotiation with the
acquired person (e.g., open market purchase,
private purchase from a third party) -- thirty
days following the acquiring person's filing; 3 5
3. Any negotiated acquisition (e.g., merger) --
thirty days following both the acquiring and
acquired person's filings. 3 6
In the first two cases the acquired person has an indepen-
dent legal obligation to file.3 7  Request for additional
information extends the period until twenty days (ten days
31. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(3) (1976).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 18(b)(2) (1976).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 18(b)(1)(B) (1976).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18(b)(1)(B) (1976).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 18(b)(1)(B) (1976).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 18(g)(1) (1976).
for cash tender offers) following the requesting agency's
receipt of the requested information.
3 8
If the acquisition is subject to the file-and-wait
provisions of section 7A, the filing may be accompanied by
voluntary submissions designed to demonstrate that the pro-
posed acquisition poses no substantive antitrust problems
and/or a request for early termination of the waiting
period.
3 9
B. Substantive Clayton Act, Section 7 Analysis
A foreign firm's acquisition of an American firm or
its assets is treated and analyzed in essentially the same
manner as a wholly domestic acquisition. Thus, an analysis
must be made to see if the acquisition will be permitted
under section 7, which prohibits the acquisition of all or
part of a domestic entity's shares or assets whenever the
transaction creates a reasonable probability of a "substan-
tial lessening of competition" in any significant "line of
commerce.,,40
For purposes of analysis, there are three broad types
of acquisitions:
1. Horizontal. Acquisitions between business
competitors, such as manufacturers of the
same type products of distributors selling
competing products in the same market area.
2. Vertical. Acquisitions between buyer and
seller of a particular product.
3. Conglomerate. Merger of corporations which
are neither competitors nor potential or
actual customers or suppliers of each other.
There are three types of conglomerate mergers:
a. Geographic extension. Merger whereby
acquiring firm extends its dominance to an
adjacent geographic market.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 18(e)(2) (1976).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 18(b)(2) (1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
b. Product extension. Merger joining of firms
with related product markets. Acquired and
acquiring companies are functionally related
in production and/or distribution but sell
products that do not compete directly with
each other.
c. Pure conglomerate merger. Merger between
two firms which operate in unrelated markets
having no functional economic relationship.
In applying the antitrust laws to merger and acquisi-
tion transactions, the courts have emphasized the above
distinctions rather than the foreign-domestic factor. Thus,
a foreign firm's acquisition of an American firm is an-
alytically comparable to the purchase of a foreign firm by
41
an American firm. Where a foreign firm already has sbu-
stantial operations in the United States, either directly
or through subsidiaries, the acquisition of an American
42
firm will normally be treated as a purely domestic merger.
While the United States had federal statutory limita-
tions on control or ownership in several specified indus-
tries (including defense, shipping and communications),
there are no general takeover controls in other market
sectors. This favorable attitude toward direct foreign in-
vestment in the United States is subject to periodic popu-
lar shifts. The official Department of Justice position
has been, and continues to be, equal and non-discriminatory
application of the antitrust laws to domestic and foreign
entities. This policy has been demonstrated by various
decisions in which courts refused to enjoin foreign take-
overs of United States companies. In Cooperweld Corp. v.
41. Cf. B.O.C. Int'l Ltd. v. F.T.C., 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Gilette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D.
Mass. 1975).
42. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp.
196 (D.N.J. 1966); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977).
43
Imetal, the court stated:
The arguments [national security limitations on
foreign control and economic reciprocal desire
for foreign capital] are off-setting and, in any
event, this Court shall treat foreign investment
exactly like domestic investment in the absence
of Congressional guidance.4 4
The greatest risk of antitrust exposure arises out of
sizeable mergers between substantial direct competitors
that sell the same product in the same market. In such
cases, it appears that the substantial lessening of com-
petition will be presumed. Supreme Court decisions dealing
with mergers suggest that the burden of justifying such a
merger is on the parties to the merger. 4 5 Where such proof
is not advanced, the Court ostensibly presumes that the
merger will adversely affect competition. The Court may
proceed with this assumption even if the market share of
the merged companies is small and entry into the market is
46
easy.
Acquisitions by foreign firms made in the United States
are not typically horizontal, since many foreign firms do
not operate within the United States. However, United
States operations by the subsidiaries of foreign firms can
create the prohibited horizontal combination and lessening
of competition.
47
In United States v. CIBA Corp., the Swiss chemical
companies with American subsidiaries that were planning to
merge were required by consent decree to divest their com-
peting lines. Likewise, the acquisition by Rhinechem
43. 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
44. Id. at 608.
45. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486, 497 (1974).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966).
47. 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Corporation, a Bayer A.G. subsidiary, of the Pigments Divi-
sion of Chemetron was attached by the FTC and enjoined by
48
a district court. Since Rhinechem already competed with
Chemetron in the manufacture of organic pigments, the trans-
action was seen to raise antitrust questions warranting a
preliminary injunction pending a determination by the FTC.
Faced with lengthy litigation and the risk of an ultimate
illegality, the transaction was abandoned.
Vertical acquisitions uniting supplier and distribu-
tor also present possible antitrust consequences. These
mergers are often referred to as either (1) "upstream" or
backward acquisition by a manufacturer of his raw materials
or parts supplier or (2) "downstream" or "forward" acquisi-
tion by a supplier of his fabricator or distributor. Ver-
tical acquisitions may be held to lessen competition in
three ways:
1. by cutting off other independent distributors
or fabricators from suppliers by the acquiring
firm; 4 9 or
2. by shutting out or "foreclosure" of the acquired
firm's competitors from sales to the acquiring
firm or its distributor organization;5O or
3. by facilitating promotional product differential
when the merger involved a manufacturing firm's
acquisition of firms at the retail level. 5 1
One example of vertical mergers that have run afoul of
the antitrust laws is the proposed acquisition by Volks-
wagen of America of a United States manufacturer of auto-
mobile air conditioners.
5 2
48. F.T.C. v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.
Ill. 1978).
49. 1977-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) s 4510 (1974).
50. 1977-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510 (1974).
51. 1977-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) V 4510 (1974).
52. Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 553 F.2d
964 (5th Cir. 1977).
The proposed transaction was held to be illegal be-
cause the acquired firm's competitors were foreclosed from
selling air conditioners to the VW organization.
The acquisition of an American aluminum fabricator by
Aluminum Ltd., a Canadian primary aluminum producer, was
challenged as harmful to the acquired fabricator's inde-
pendent rivals who would be forced to compete with the
newly formed integrated producer/fabricator.
3
The most common form of merger is the conglomerate
merger. In practice, it appears that conglomerate mergers
(acquisitions by foreign firms having no product similari-
ties or customer/supplier relations with the acquired
American firm) have not been attacked under the United
States antitrust laws. The series of cases brought by the
Department of Justice in the late 1960's seeking to extend
the antimerger laws to large conglomerate acquisitions on
the basis of size and concentration of power failed in the
trial courts. The courts generally declined to extend
statutory antitrust bans beyond acquisitions hostile to
competition in a particular market.
5 4
Notwithstanding this general attitude, product diver-
sifications or extension by acquisition in related fields
have been challenged. Since such transactions do not unite
firms competing in the manufacture or sale of the same
product, no automatic lessening of competition can be pre-
sumed. An illegal impairment of competition may be charged,
however, in either of two settings:
53. United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,366 (D.N.J. 1965).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought Inc.,
1971 Trade Cas.. (CCH) 173,607 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States
v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas (CCH) 1 73,619
(N.D. Ill. 1971), dismissal vacated and consent decree en-
tered, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,667 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
1. If "potential competition" between the merging
firms in nearby product markets is extinguished
by the acquisition 5 5 or
2. If the acquired firm's dominant competitive
position in its own field is "entrenched"
through its acquisition by a top or powerful
firm in a related field.5
The doctrine of potential competition is viable today
but will be applied only in concentrated markets. In deter-
mining the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have
taken into consideration various factors, such as the nature
or extent of the relevant market, the nearness of the ab-
sorbed corporation to that market, that corporation's
eagerness to enter the market, its resourcefulness, and
similar circumstances. The controlling issue in most cases
is the status of the acquiring company as a potential
competitor.
In addition to the-general aspects connected with the
purpose of preventing the loss of potential competition,
the doctrine includes two additional theories: the doctrine
of the perceived or fringe effect of potential entry and the
doctrine of actual potential entry. The essence of the per-
ceived potential entry doctrine is that the court will ana-
lyze whether a company is a potential competitor in the
sense that its position on the edge of the market exerted a
beneficial influence on the market's competitive conditions.
57
The doctrine of actual potential entry proscribes the
acquisition of a large corporation by a corporation which is
probably about to enter the relevant market de novo or
through a toehold acquisition of a small corporation. This
55. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964).
56. See F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
57. See United States v. Flagstaff Brewing Corp., 410
U.S. 526, 533-37 (1973).
theory was applied in the area of foreign investment in BOC
58
International Ltd. v. FTC. The court there held that the
application of the actual potential entrant doctrine must
contain at least some reasonable temporal estimate related
to the near future, with "near"Idefined in terms of entry
barriers and lead time necessary for entry into a particular
industry. BOC's capability for some "eventual" future ex-
pansion into American markets on its own did not show suf-
ficient "potential" competition. "Probabilities" rather
than "ephemeral possibilities" was the applicable stand-
ard.
5 9
In the recent case of Yamaha Motor Co. v. F.T.C.,
6 0
the actual potential entrant doctrine was again applied.
The court based its determination on the likelihood that
the foreign entity would itself enter the relevant market
should the proposed action be prohibited and whether the
entry of the foreign entity itself would have a better ef-
fort on competition than would the proposed action (here
the creation of a joint venture with an American corpora-
tion). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the FTC finding that the United States firm's acquisition
of stock in the jointly named company violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act as it may have eliminated the foreign firm as an
actual potential entrant into the concentrated market.
A similar analysis has been applied with respect to
product extension conglomerate mergers. An illegal lessen-
ing of competition may be asserted if the acquiring firm was
58. 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
59. Id. at 28.
60. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,202 (8th Cir. 1981).
on the verge of expanding into the acquired firm's product
markets, or if its powerful presence "in the wings" or at
the edge of the market exerted a perceptible competitive
influence on the price levels or on competitive dynamism in
the acquired firm's market. The antitrust risks of product
extension mergers are exemplified by the U.S. Supreme
Court's invalidation of the acquisition of Clorox, the lead-
ing American bleach producer, by Proctor & Gamble, the top
61
manufacturer of household detergents, and of the acquisi-
tion of S.O.S. the foremost domestic steel wool producer,
by General Foods, a large manufacturer of food and grocery
62
products. In both cases, the "entrenched" competitive
position of the acquired firm was fortified through its
acquisition by a financially potent parent corporation in
the related field, with strong advertising and marketing
capabilities at its disposal. The same analysis was applied
to attempted foreign investment when the FTC attacked the
acquisition of Stouffer Foods, the leading American firm
in the "quality" frozen food market, by Nestle, the Swiss
63
multi-national food processor.
The principal of potential competition also applies
to geographic market extensions as well. In such cases,
the acquisition of one leading firm by another leading firm
in the same product area but in different geographic markets
runs a risk of illegality if the transaction terminates pre-
existing potential competition by the acquiring firm. An
acquiring firm that is on the verge of internal expansion
61. F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
62. General Foods Corp. v. F.T.C., 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
63. See F.T.C. Summary: Nestle Divests Frozen-Food
Plant in Settlement (April 27, 1979).
into the acquired firm's markets, or that exerts a substan-
tial perceived competitive influence within those markets,
may be viewed as lessening substantial potential competition
if it expands by a sizeable acquisition. Nevertheless,
substantial market extension acquisitions have been success-
fully completed.
6 4
Entry into a market by means of an acquisition may be
deemed to contribute to competition, rather than lessen it,
in what are termed "toe-hold" acquisitions. This doctrine
asserts that an acquisition of a small firm in an oligopol-
istic market might enhance competition as well as a de novo
entry. Since the small firm was not effective in its com-
petition with the oligopolists, the small firm fortified
by the acquiring firm, may become a viable competitor. An
acquisition of a firm with a market share of 10% or less in
a concentrated industry can be expected to qualify as a
toe-hold acquisition.
6 5
C. Governmental Guidelines
In 1968, the United States Department of Justice is-
66
sued its Merger Guidelines, indicating the analysis it
would apply in deciding whether to proceed against mergers.
These guidelines do not bind the courts but are meant to
aid businessman and their advisors in evaluating potential
antitrust exposure. These guidelines represent the stand-
ards applied by the Department of Justice in determining
whether to challenge corporate acquisitions or mergers under
section 7 of the Clayton Act. The policy of the current
64. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1970
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,988 (N.D. Ohio 1970); B.O.C. Inter-
national Ltd. v. F.T.C., 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
65. See, e.g., Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518 (1975).
66. 1977-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4510 (1968).
administration indicates that these guidelines are conser-
vative and a revision to reflect this change in attitude is
under consideration.
The Federal Trade Commission is also involved in the
enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act. In a statement
made before the Senate Judiciary Committee, FTC Chairman
James C. Miller stated that "mergers play an important and
often procompetitive role in our society." 6 7 He continued
on to reiterate that the Federal Trade Commission will con-
tinue to "vigorously pursue" challenges to mergers that
create monopoly power and thus adversely affect prices and
rate of product improvement.
6 8
Chairman Miller indicated that while the government's
approach to mergers has been to challenge takeovers because
they resulted in increased market share for the merged firms,
in the future additional factors would be considered.
6 9
These factors include efficiencies likely to result from
the merger, and the constraints imposed by foreign producers
and by producers of closely related products. Thus, it ap-
pears that the Federal Trade Commission will be increasingly
willing to take into consideration the procompetitive effects
of a proposed merger when deciding whether to challenge the
merger.
II. Joint Ventures
An alternative to merger or acquisition as a means for
foreign entities to enter the United States market is the
67. Statement made before the Senate Judiciary Committee
by James C. Miller, F.T.C. Chairman.
68. Id.
69. Id.
formation of a joint venture. Such enterprises may range
from technology exchanges to commercial partnerships.
Joint ventures are subject to the Sherman Act's prohibition
of unreasonable restraints of trade and the Clayton Act ban
on acquisitions that may lessen competition. 7 0 They may
also be challenged by the FTC as an "unfair method of com-
petition". 71
The creation of a joint corporation and the taking of
its shares by the parent corporations will be analyzed
under the same principles applicable to other acquisitions.
7 2
All joint ventures face potential scrutiny since the co-
operation of the parent corporations in the joint venture
may foster other mutual restraints or anticompetitive or
collusive activities on their part.
In assessing the potential antitrust liability in-
volved in the formation of any joint venture, attention
should be given to the balance between the competitive
necessity of the joint venture or its contribution to addi-
tional competition as and its potential for diminishing pre-
existing or potential competition between the foreign and
domestic parents. Research joint ventures should be
analyzed under the Department of Justice Guidelines.
7 3
The most significant antitrust considerations arise
out of joint distribution or sales ventures between foreign
and domestic product competitors. These ventures create
little or no new competitive activity and end commercial
70. See, e.g., United States v. Hercules Inc., 1973-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,530 (D. Del. 1973).
71. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 1981-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) s 64,202 (8th Cir. 1981).
72. Id.
73. UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE
CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES (November, 1980).
rivalry in the United States between the parents of the
venture. The safest type of joint venture is the creation
of a new entity to develop the foreign entity's new product
in a new market which it has no capability of entering
alone.
III. Particular Elements of United States Antitrust Laws
as to Which Foreign Investors Should Be Advised
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
7 4
The antitrust laws of the United States involve a more
stringent limitation on price fixing than do the laws of
many other nations. Violations of these statutes is a
felony and, hence, punishable by imprisonment and/or a sub-
stantial fine.
7 5
Also of significance is the validity of the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine under the antitrust laws of the
United States. This doctrine is not followed in most for-
eign countries and is specifically excluded from the anti-
trust law of the European Economic Community. A series of
Supreme Court cases suggests that the fact that a parent and
its subsidiaries are incorporated separately is sufficient
to create the requisite plurality under section 1 of the
Shermn Act76
Sherman Act. 7 The doctrine is applicable especially where
the alleged conspirators "hold themselves out as competitors". 7 7
While the language of the Supreme Court is very broad
so as to permit the conclusion that activities of the parent
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-142 (1968).
77. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc.,
340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
and its subsidiaries are unprotected entirely from antitrust
liability, a number of lower federal courts have sought to
limit the application of the doctrine. In Ark Dental Supply
Company v. Cavitron Corporation, 7 8 the Court held that the
business decision of the parent to sell only to dealers of
a division of the parent corporation did not constitute a
conspiracy since the alleged conspirators, the parent and
its division did not hold themselves out as competitors.
Likewise, no conspiracy was held to exist where the con-
certed action between the affiliated corporations did not
restrain the trade of the third party.
7 9
In I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York Fruit Auction
80
Corp., the Court held that there was no anticompetitive
motive for the separate corporate status of the defendants.
For purposes of section 1, the two defendants were regarded
as a single entity and therefore incapable, as a matter of
law, of concerted activity, conspiracy or contracting with
one another. The Court reasoned that the sole purpose of
creating separate corporate identities was to separate the
employees of each operation into separate unions with dif-
ferent fringe benefits. Since there was no anticompetitive
motive and the two entities were "clearly parts of an in-
tegral operation, so unified that they cannot be regarded
as separate in any but the most perfunctory and technical
81
manner" the Court held there could be no conspiracy.
78. 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972).
79. R.E.A. Express, Inc. v. Alabama Great Southern R.
Co., 427 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
80. 364 F. Supp. 868, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
81. Id. See also Grant Paper & Film Corp. v. Albermarle
Paper Corp., 430 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) [where the
court held no conspiracy existed since the affiliated cor-
porations were, for practical purposes, "a single business
unit"].
B. Robinson-Patman Act
8 2
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 8 3 prohibits
price discrimination. For section 2(a) to apply, three
jurisdictional requirements must be met. 8 4 First, the
85
seller must be engaged in interstate commerce. Second,
one or more of the purchasers involved in the discrimina-
86
tion must be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.
Finally, the commodities sold must be for use, consumption
or resale within the United States, its territories or a
place under its jurisdiction.
8 7
The supposed purpose behind the Robinson-Patman Act is
to prevent mass distribution retailers, particularly larger
entities, from obtaining discriminatory concessions from
manufacturers. Conduct proscribed by the Act usually falls
into one of three principal categories. Volume and quantity
discounts are concessions made to buyers based on the total
volume of purchases during a given period of time or based
88
on the amount bought in a single transaction. The grant
of such a discount is not a violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act if the discounts are available to all customers
on a non-discriminatory basis; this equality of treatment
must exist in practice as well as in theory.
8 9
The second major category of Robinson-Patman pro-
scribed activity is that of functional discounts. Func-
tional discounts are discounts based on the distributive
82. 15 U.S.C. §§13(a),(b), 21(a) (1976).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
88. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S.
37 (1948).
89. Id. at 42.
services performed by various types of marketing intermedi-
aries, such as warehousing, invoicing or the performance of
credit functions.
9 0
The courts have generally taken a rather narrow view
with respect to the conduct that will be deemed to consti-
tute a functional discount. 9 1 The concession in price must
not exceed the fair value of the function performed; the
grant of concessions in excess of such value received will
create antitrust liability.
The other common form of price discrimination is selec-
tive price concessions in favor of a particular customer.
9 2
A violation of the Robinson-Patman Act occurs where a seller
grants discounts or allowances haphazardly to particular
customers where such discounts or allowances would not have
been available under seller's announced price schedule.
9 3
For the proscribed conduct discussed to create liability
there must be an adverse effect on competition.
Foreign nations generally do not prohibit price dis-
crimination unless that discrimination is accompanied by a
dominant market position.
9 4
C. Interlocking Directorates
Section 8 of Clayton Act prohibits a person from being
a director in two or more corporations, meeting the juris-
dictional requirements, which are competitors. 9 5  This
90. F.L.M. Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
543 F.2d 1091 (2d Cir. 1976).
91. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470
(1952); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp.
230 (D.N.J. 1956).
92. See, e.g., Western Grain Co., 49 F.T.C. 983 (1952).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
94. See European Economic Community, Treaty of Rome,
Art. 85 & 86, Jan. 1, 1958, Europ T.S.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
prohibition is aimed at restrictions of competition which
may come about if ostensibly competing companies are, in
reality, controlled by the same set of people.
In Borg-Warner Corp., 6 an administrative law judge of
the Federal Trade Commission recommended the termination
of interlocking directorates between Borg-Warner and Robert
Bosch Corporation (a West German parent with United States
subsidiaries). The two corporations competed in the mar-
ket for the sale of automobile replacement parts. An
order was issued prohibiting the two corporations from
sharing a director with any competitor. The ruling was
limited, with respect to Robert Bosch, however, to apply
only to corporations doing business in the United States.
IV. Conclusion
As a general proposition, a foreign firm's investing
or conducting business in the United States is subject to
the United States antitrust laws. The Justice Department
has summarized the situation as follows:
The Department's most important concern is to
protect the United States domestic market against
restraints on competition -- restraints on entry,
pricing and terms of sale. In carrying out this
effort, no essential distinction is made between
domestic and foreign firms. In general, foreign
firms, including state-owned or controlled firms,
will be expected to observe the prohibitions
of our antitrust laws, and to benefit from the
enforcement of those laws in the same manner as
domestically incorporated enterprises.
9 7
Foreign firms seeking to enter the American market-place by
means of the acquisition of assets in the United States
96. Borg-Warner Corp., F.T.C. (1980) (F.T.C.
docket no. 9120).
97. UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE
FOR INT'L OPERATIONS, p.9 (rev. ed. March, 1980).
must be made aware of the nuances of the United States
antitrust law. The importance of retaining counsel know-
ledgeable in the area cannot be overemphasized.
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